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I. INTRODUCTION
Recognition of the fact that there is a right to the effective assistance of counsel
in state capital post-conviction proceedings is long overdue.' Of the many reasons for
the legal system to acknowledge the right, one is perhaps counter-intuitive: to do so is
very much in the narrow self-interests of the affected governments, both state and
federal. In the discussion that follows I first sketch the factual and legal background
(Part II), then elaborate on the benefits governments gain and costs they avoid by
acting now (Parts III-V), and conclude by putting the issue into the context of system-
wide considerations (Part VI).
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I I have suggested this previously. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right
to Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1079 (2006) [hereinafter
Freedman, Giarratano]; Eric M. Freedman, The RevisedABA Guidelines and The Duties ofLawyers and
Judges in Capital Post-conviction Proceedings, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 327 (2003) [hereinafter
Freedman, The Revised ABA Guidelines]; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003),
reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919-38 (2003) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (Guideline 1.1 and
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II. BACKGROUND
2For two decades after the revival of capital punishment in 1976, state post-
conviction review was a small but tactically important outpost in the campaign to
correct legal and factual error. The most comprehensive available data shows that of
every hundred death sentences imposed through 1995, sixty-eight percent did not
survive post-conviction review; forty-seven percent were reversed at the state level
(roughly forty-one percent on direct appeal and six percent on state collateral attack);
and a further twenty-one percent on federal habeas corpus3 (which, however, could
occur only after the petitioners had successfully run the gauntlet of state post-
conviction proceedings).4
In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was
enacted; that turned state capital post-conviction review from an outpost to a critical
strategic location.5 Because federal habeas corpus courts were limited in their review
of the factual and legal determinations of the state courts,6 those courts' final
pronouncements on questions of both guilt and sentence routinely became
authoritative.
State courts speak their last word in post-conviction proceedings. If it is to be
one that can be relied upon, the prisoner must have the assistance not just of counsel,7
but of competent counsel. "Counsel's obligations in state collateral review
proceedings are demanding. Counsel must be prepared to thoroughly reinvestigate the
2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the death penalty does not violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in all circumstances).
3 See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 932 n.46 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1) (citing James S.
Liebman, Jeffrey A. Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,
pt. I, app. A, at 5-6 (2000), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/).
The statistics from the comprehensive empirical study by Professor Liebman and his colleagues have
been distilled in James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000). A fuller discussion is contained in Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System:
The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 209 (2004).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000).
5 As described more fully infra text accompanying notes 29-31, last term in Rhines v. Weber,
544 U.S. 269 (2005), the Court quite appropriately relaxed the rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509
(1982) (requiring dismissal of federal habeas corpus petitions containing claims that had not been
exhausted in state court) in light of its recognition that, "[t]he enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically
altered the landscape for federal habeas corpus petitions." Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274.
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e) (providing that writ may not be granted unless state proceedings
resulted in a decision that "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts").
7 See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Rrmy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending That Death Row
Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 Loy. L. REV. 55
(1999).
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entire case to ensure that the client was neither actually innocent nor convicted or
sentenced to death in violation of either state or federal law."
8
To date the Supreme Court has weighed in only once, in a 1989 inkblot entitled
Murray v. Giarratano.9 Although it is commonly said that Giarratano held that there
is no federal constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings in capital
cases, that is not true." Four Justices did indeed reject petitioner's claim. 2 ButJustice Kennedy concurred in the judgment only and wrote separately stating that:
The requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various ways....
While Virginia has not adopted procedures for securing representation that
are as far reaching and effective as those available in other States, no
prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to
represent him in post-conviction proceedings, and Virginia's prison system
is staffed with institutional lawyers to assist in preparing petitions for post-
conviction relief. I am not prepared to say that this scheme violates the
Constitution. On the facts and record of this case, I concur in the judgment
of the Court.'
3
Intriguingly, Justice O'Connor joined this opinion, as well as that of the plurality,
writing that she did not view the two as inconsistent.1
4
Whatever may be gleaned from all this, one fact is clear enough: the judgment of
the Court turned on the conclusion of Justice Kennedy that "on the facts and records
of this case" Virginia had met its constitutional responsibilities. Giarratano did not
rule that no constitutional duty existed.' 5 On the contrary, five, and perhaps six,
Justices believed that one did.
III. FROM PAST TO PRESENT
Quite apart from any constitutional obligation, for a decade Chapter 154 of the
AEDPA has given states a statutory incentive to provide effective post-conviction
defense counsel in capital cases. Those that have mechanisms for the provision of
8 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 932-33 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1) (footnote omitted). See
id. at 935 (elaborating on these duties).
9 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
1o See, e.g., Morris v. Dretke, 90 F. App'x 62, 72 (5th Cir. 2004); King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237,
1245 (Fla. 2002).
11 For a fuller discussion, see Freedman, Giarratano, supra note 1, Parts 1, 111.
12 See Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, O'Connor & Scalia, JJ.).
13 Id. at 14-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15 Cf GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 933 n.47 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1) (encouraging counsel
"to test the boundaries of Murray v. Giarratano").
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"competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent
prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct
appeal"' 16 are entitled to a number of significant procedural advantages in federal
habeas corpus litigation. Yet no state has created a qualifying system.
17
Whether this outcome reflects political cynicism 18 or a rational cost-benefit
analysis,' 9 the undeniable bottom line is that Chapter 154 standing alone has proved
insufficient to persuade the states that their own best interests would be served by the
provision of effective post-conviction counsel in death penalty cases.
But Chapter 154 does not stand alone. In recent years there has been a steady
trend in the states towards granting such assistance; all but one of the significant death
penalty states do so, and, more importantly, fourteen of those thirty-seven states have
a state law requirement that counsel be effective.20 There is every reason to expect
that, as a result of pressure from the bar,2 1 the press, 22 and the judiciary, 23 the number
of states with this requirement will grow24 and that the current unsatisfactory realities
on the ground25 will increasingly conform to the legal ideal.
16 28 U.S.C. § 226 1(b) (2000). A state which does this is said to have "opted-in" under Chapter
154 of the statute. For a summary of the advantages to the states of opting-in, see GUIDELINES, supra
note 1, at 931 n.40 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1).
17 See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 274-75
(2006).
18 See Eric M. Freedman, Add Resources and Apply Them Systemically: Governments'
Responsibilities Under the Revised ABA Capital Defense Representation Guidelines, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1097, 1099-1100 (2003).
19 See Blume, supra note 17, at 276 n.98.
20 The details can be found in Freedman, Giarratano, supra note 1, Part 11.
21 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Evaluating Fairness andAccuracy in State Death Penalty
Systems: The Georgia Death Penalty Assessment Report, 2006 A.B.A. DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM
IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT REP. 3-6, 147-52 (finding that the Georgia system for provision ofcounsel in
capital cases is in "a situation where this critical constitutional safeguard is so undermined as to be
ineffective"), available at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/georgia/finalreport.doc;
Leigh Jones, ABA Launches Effort to Improve Capital Case Defense, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 2003, at 1.
22 See, e.g., Editorial, Breathing Life into a Moratorium, BIRMINGHAM NEws, March 1, 2006, at
8A (opining that if Alabama is to retain death penalty it should at least implement ABA Guidelines);
Leonard Post, On Their Own: In Alabama, Some Inmates Don t Have Lawyers as They Near the Last Bid
for Life, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 1,2003, at I; Agency Claims Death Row Inmates Without Lawyers a Growing
Problem, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 26, 2001, at B8 (describing effects of absence of state
funding for post-conviction capital representation in Alabama)[hereinafter Agency Claims].
23 See, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 928-29 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1) (quoting
concerns of several Justices about quality of capital defense representation).
24 See generally Sarah L. Thomas, Comment, A Legislative Challenge: A Proposed Model Statute
to Provide for the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedings for Indigent Petitioners,
54 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1167 (2005) (urging state legislatures not to "passively stand by and wait for their
state courts or the U.S. Supreme Court to take action... [but rather] utilize their resources to implement
a statutory right to counsel for indigent habeas corpus petitioners").
25 See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 932 n.47 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1). For an overview of
the landscape, see Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-
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Unless Congress intervenes in a disruptive way, as it is currently threatening to
do,26 these developments could alter the cost-benefit calculus. As the states review
their situations in response to pressures for improvements in their death penalty
systems, they may well realize that with the investment of relatively small increments
of resources they could achieve significant gains. Having already waded waist-deep
into the sea by providing some counsel, taking the plunge to full immersion by
requiring competent counsel should appear less daunting both politically and
economically and the Chapter 154 inducements correspondingly more enticing.
IV. FROM PRESENT TO FUTURE
A. State Issues
Even if the federal courts do not directly recognize a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel in capital cases as a matter of federal statutory or
constitutional law, the states are running significant litigation risks if they fail to
provide such assistance.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York suggested some time ago
that "if post-conviction counsel is found to have been ineffective, then, with respect to
any proceedings in which that attorney participated, the state should not be entitled to
the benefits of' any presumptions of correctness of factual findings, failures to
exhaust issues, or procedural defaults.27 Today, states that fail to provide competent
post-conviction counsel in capital cases may well forfeit the benefits of these three
habeas corpus doctrines. I consider each in turn.
The City Bar's proposition with respect to factual findings is easily supportable
by existing case authority.
28
The proposal concerning exhaustion has been adopted in a suggestive opinion by
the District Court whose ruling was vindicated by a unanimous Supreme Court in
Rhines v. Weber.29 The Supreme Court had acted against the background of its 1982
holding in Rose v. Lundy3° that a federal habeas corpus court faced with a petition
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims could not entertain it but was
Conviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 353-80 (2003).
26 See Blume, supra note 17, at 276 n.99. See also infra text accompanying note 54.
27 See Comm. on Civil Rights, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Legislative Modification of
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 REc. ASs'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 848, 855
(1989) (footnote omitted). I served as the principal drafter of this report.
28 See, e.g., Lane v. Henderson, 480 F.2d 544, 545 (5th Cir. 1973). This rule is simply a specific
application of the general principle that the greater the procedural unreliability of state fact-finding
processes, the less the deference their results will be given on federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., Parker v.
Woodford, 168 F. App'x 152 (9th Cir. 2006); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1220 (10th Cir.
1989).
29 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
30 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
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required to dismiss the entire petition unless the petitioner agreed to proceed only on
the exhausted claims. At the time, the only consequence of a District Court following
this procedure would be to delay the ultimate vindication of the petitioner's rights in
federal courts. But "[t]he enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the
landscape for federal habeas corpus petitions." 31 AEDPA not only "preserved Lundy's
total exhaustion requirement, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)... but it also imposed a
1-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal petitions, § 2244(d).... As a result
of the interplay between AEDPA's 1-year statute of limitations and Lundy's dismissal
requirement, petitioners who come to federal court with 'mixed' petitions run the risk
of forever losing any federal review of their unexhausted claims.,
32
Responding to these changed circumstances, the Supreme Court in Rhines upheld
what the District Court had done (and the Eighth Circuit had reversed), namely to hold
the exhausted claims in abeyance while allowing the petitioner to return to state court
to exhaust the remaining ones.33 In approving this procedure, the Supreme Court said
that "stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there
was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.,
34
The case returned to the District Court for application of this requirement. There,
the petitioner contended that he had "good cause for his failure to exhaust his claims
in state court because his post-conviction counsel was ineffective." 35 Relying on
Coleman v. Thompson, a bastard spawn of Giarratano,36 the state "argue[d] that
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel cannot serve as good cause for failure to
exhaust [the] claims in state court, just as ineffective assistance of counsel is not good
cause to excuse a procedural default."
37
Noting that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to affect the timing of relief
rather than to preclude it altogether, and that the Supreme Court had embraced a
broader definition of good cause in the exhaustion context than in that of procedural
default,38 the District Court rejected the government's argument. It concluded that
31 Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274.
32 Id.
33 See Rhines v. Weber, 346 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2003).
34 Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277.
35 Rhines v. Weber, 408 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (D.S.D. 2005).
36 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (holding capital petitioner to have
forfeited review of federal claims because appellate papers in state post-conviction proceedings filed
three days late and rejecting an attack on effectiveness of counsel because "There is no constitutional
right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings ... Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings."); Eric M. Freedman, Federal
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 553, 568
(James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (describing result as intellectually and practically untenable and
"morally indefensible").
37 Rhines, 408 F. Supp. 2d, at 847.
38 Id. at 849 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,416-17 (2005) and relying upon the fact
that the Court had remanded this very case).
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permitting petitioner to return to state court would comply "with the principles of
comity and federalism that underlie the exhaustion doctrine." 39 The result was that the
state suffered a litigation delay and the cost of an additional round of state litigation
that it would have prevented by providing the petitioner competent post-conviction
counsel at the outset.4n
The City Bar's third suggestion, that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction
counsel should preclude states in federal habeas proceedings from reliance upon
procedural defaults, may well find judicial acceptance soon. Capital litigators have
begun to build upon on the longstanding provision of the habeas corpus statute
excusing the exhaustion requirement where "there is an absence of available State
corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant.",
4
'
Extending this principle from exhaustion to preclusion, it is entirely sensible that
a state post-conviction remedy that is no more than a delusive hope, for example one
that cannot be effectually employed without the assistance of a competent attorney,
should not generate a procedural default that the federal courts are bound to respect
2
any more than do other forfeitures arising from state rules that fail to provide litigants
with a fair opportunity to assert their federal claims.43 Indeed, the unconscionable
failure of Alabama to provide any pre-filing assistance at all to its capital post-
conviction petitioners44 has already caused the federal courts to refuse to find
procedural default in contexts in which they might otherwise have done so.
45
39 Id. The court also relied upon several cases from other districts which it characterized as
having "found that alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during post-conviction proceedings did
constitute good cause for failure to exhaust claims in state proceedings," id. at 7, but did not distinguish
in its citation between cases in which the asserted ineffectiveness took place on direct appeal and on
collateral review. Cf Velasquez v. Grace, 2006 WL 89214 at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2006) (non-
exhaustion excused and merits reached in non-capital case where counsel was ineffective on direct appeal
and state-post-conviction, notwithstanding absence of a constitutional right to counsel in the latter
context).
40 The federal government for its part had to pay for competent appointed counsel to assert the
position that petitioner should be allowed to return to state court. See infra Part IV.B.
4' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2000). Ample authority supports the proposition that the
terms of the section are met where "the alleged state remedy is nothing but a procedural morass offering
no substantial hope of relief." Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 136 n.8 (1987). See, e.g., Bartone v.
United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963); Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1982); Galtieri v.
Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 354 n.12 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
42 This claim is being actively litigated in Grayson v. Epps, No. 1:04CV708 (S.D. Miss. filed Apr.
25, 2005).
43 See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 26.2d, at notes 45-47 and accompanying text (5th ed. 2005) (collecting extensive authority).
44 See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 932 n.47, 1081 n.333 (singling out Alabama as engaging in
"irresponsible behavior" and encouraging counsel to litigate constitutional challenges).
45 See Dallas v. Haley, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (staying execution two days
before it was to occur for inmate who had been appointed counsel by court after filing of post-conviction
petition but whose appeal from the dismissal of that petition had been dismissed as untimely); Barbour v.
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Of course, if the flaws in the state procedure rise to the level of a constitutional
violation then the argument becomes essentially impregnable; a state is not entitled to
benefit in federal court from prior proceedings that fall below constitutional minima.46
There is a strong case to be made that the states are now seeking to do precisely that.
Having created post-conviction remedies, the states are constitutionally required to
provide litigants a fair opportunity to pursue them. 47 Specifically, under longstanding
doctrines of procedural due process, a capital prisoner in post-conviction litigation
should be entitled to the provision of competent counsel.48 This line of reasoning
poses a significant risk to the states: the danger that they will increasingly be unable to
rely in federal habeas corpus proceedings upon the defense of procedural default, a
defense that has to date been one of their most effective.
In light of these three distinct threats to its litigation interests arising from the
failure to provide competent post-conviction counsel in capital cases, a state
concerned with maximizing the likelihood that its capital convictions will be
expeditiously upheld on federal habeas corpus review would be well advised to
provide such counsel.
B. Federal Issues
The existing unsatisfactory situation burdens the federal government. Federal
law provides for the appointment of qualified counsel in habeas corpus proceedings
challenging state capital convictions, 49 and, of course, one of the key duties of such
counsel is to attempt to overcome any procedural blunders committed by state post-
conviction attorneys-a duty whose competent discharge involves significant
expense. 50 But if appointed federal habeas counsel fails to do this job effectively, a
petitioner may be able to assert rights flowing from the federal statutory mandate for
qualified counsel, 5' even though he could not predicate a habeas corpus claim directly
on the ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel.
52
Haley, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (staying execution two days before it was to occur for
inmate who had been appointed counsel by court after filing of state post-conviction petition but whose
counsel withdrew before dismissal of petition with result that no appeal from that dismissal was ever
filed).
46 See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1988) (holding the state is not entitled to
rely in capital sentencing on conviction that had been vacated for failure to provide defendant with
counsel).
47 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982).
48 See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980). The argument is made in greater detail in
Freedman, Giarratano, supra note 1, Part IV.
49 See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) (noting
importance of this entitlement "in promoting fundamental fairness in the imposition of the death
penalty").
50 See Freedman, The Revised ABA Guidelines, supra note 1, at 342-43.
51 See Cooey v. Bradshaw, 216 F.R.D. 408,415-16 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (granting stay of execution
on claim of ineffective assistance by prior counsel appointed under § 848), motion to vacate stay denied,
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Thus, whether appointed federal habeas counsel performs well or badly in
cleaning up the mess left behind by ineffective lawyers in state capital post-conviction
proceedings, the federal government bears significant costs caused by the states'
failure to provide competent counsel in the first place. Perhaps in recognition of these
financial realities, if not of the demands of fundamental fairness, Congress has
recently begun to provide funds to assist the states in their efforts.
53
Looking ahead, even if Congress amends Chapter 154 by moving the decision as
to whether the statutory criteria are met from the courts to the Attorney General of the
United States, 54 the interests of the federal government would be best served by
insisting that post-conviction capital attorneys provided by the states truly are capable
ones.
V. PEERING OVER THE HORIZON
The prevailing interpretation of Giarratano as denying a right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings in capital cases will probably be overruled or at least
significantly narrowed.55 Moreover, "[e]ven if the federal constitutional proposition
endures, its practical effect will predictably be undermined by a series of
developments in state and federal law that render it irrelevant."
56
At least three significant consequences follow.
First, because capital litigation is notoriously lengthy, states that do not provide
competent post-conviction counsel today may find their convictions reversed on the
basis of legal developments, whether constitutional or otherwise, that occur tomorrow.
For example, the states are at continuing risk of challenges under Section 1983 to the
validity of their overall systems for the provision of post-conviction capital counsel-
challenges in which the courts will apply the law at the time of decision.57 Indeed, at
least one such action is already being actively litigated.
58
338 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2003), motion to vacate stay denied, 539 U.S. 974 (2003).
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2004) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during
Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding
arising under section 2254.").
" See 42 U.S.C. § 14163 (2004); see also Lily Henning, The White House's Capital Venture,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at I (discussing President Bush's support for such funding in his State of
the Union Address on Feb. 2, 2005).
54 As indicated supra text accompanying note 26, various proposals to this effect are presently in
circulation in Congress. On behalf of the ABA, I testified against one of these. See Rhonda McMillion,
Not So Fast: ABA Contends Proposed Habeas Legislation Would Sacrifice Principles for Speed, 92
A.B.A. J. 65 (2006). The gist of the opposition was that if the Attorney General used the new authority
inappropriately to certify state mechanisms that were not providing genuinely competent counsel, there
would be system-wide negative effects.
55 The argument in support of this assertion is set forth at length in Freedman, Giarratano, supra
note 1.
56 Freedman, The Revised ABA Guidelines, supra note 1, at 329.
57 Cf Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 639-40 (2004) (challenge to state's lethal injection
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Second, turning to the context of federal habeas corpus attacks on individual
convictions, if Giarratano is overruled or re-written the resulting rule may, under
Teague v. Lane,59 be retroactively binding on the states. The Court could reach this
conclusion by one of two straightforward paths.
The Court might, and indeed should, hold that in enforcing a duty to provide
competent post-conviction counsel in capital cases it was not creating a new rule but
merely applying an old one.60 A decision that some particular state-Alabama, say-
was acting unconstitutionally would be a ruling that it was violating an already-
existing obligation 6 '-one that the state was well aware of and chose to disregard at
its own risk.62 In that event Teague would not apply.
63
Alternatively, even if a rule requiring the states to provide post-conviction
counsel in capital cases were "new," so that Teague would apply, this particular new
rule might easily be determined to be retroactive on the grounds that it fell within the
Teague exception for new rules making a fundamental contribution to reliable
decisionmaking. 64 As indicated in Part II, the realities are simple. Under AEDPA
state post-conviction proceedings are likely to be the prisoner's last chance to find and
assert claims of legal or factual error. Without the assistance of diligent counsel, that
opportunity is drained of practical meaning6 5 -with the result that judicial
determinations must be made on the basis of trial records that, as several Justices have
acknowledged, are systematically inadequate.66
protocols properly brought under Section 1983; plaintiff entitled to a stay of execution pendente lite).
58 See Barbour v. Haley, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (class action challenging
Alabama system). On January 23, 2006, the District Court in a lengthy opinion dismissed the action on
the merits. Plaintiffs have appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, where the case is pending as this is written.
'9 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
60 This argument, outlined supra text accompanying notes 13-15, is made at length in Freedman,
Giarratano, supra note 1, Part Ill.
61 Cf Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 315 (1989) (rule mandating that Texas juries take mental
retardation into account in imposing capital sentences was not imposing new obligation on the state, but
simply requiring it "to fulfill the assurance upon which [Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)] was based:
namely that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to permit the sentencer to consider all
of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present in imposing sentence").
62 See, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra, note 1, at 1081 n.333 (Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1)
(criticizing Alabama's performance and urging counsel to challenge it as a federal constitutional
violation); Editorial, supra note 22; Agency Claims, supra note 22. Similarly, Georgia has been warned
repeatedly that its system for the provision of capital post-conviction counsel is constitutionally
inadequate, see, e.g., American Bar Association, supra note 21, and thus will hardly be able to claim that
it is being blind-sided when a court agrees.
63 See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 43, at § 25.5 (demonstrating impossibility of
predicting whether rule will be denominated "new").
64 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13 (describing exception); see also Freedman, Giarratano, supra
note 1, Part V (showing importance of post-conviction counsel to achievement of accurate outcomes in
capital cases).
65 See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 932-35 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1).
66 See id. at 928-29.
FEWER RISKS, MORE BENEFITS
Third, as continuing factual and legal developments make the constitutional
claim stronger, Congress would be increasingly justified both legally67 and politically
in shifting the costs of compliance entirely to the states by simply imposing an
unfunded mandate in the exercise of its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.68
Together, these considerations mean that in failing to provide competent post-
conviction in capital cases now, the states are running significant legal risks for the
future that they should be eager to avoid as a matter of narrow self-interest.
VI. A LAST LOOK
It should be unnecessary to add that the ultimate concerns in this area are not
limited to ones that are susceptible to narrow calculations of financial and litigation
costs and benefits. Nor is this a question that pits the defense bar against prosecutors.
The interest in insuring that the decision of the government to execute a person in the
name of its citizens is based upon the most complete possible factual and legal picture
belongs not just to each individual actor in the legal system---including judges and
victims as well as defendants and prosecuting and defense attorneys-but to society as
a whole.
The failure to provide competent counsel to capital prisoners in post-conviction
proceedings imperils the achievement of the basic goal of a system of justice:
justice.69
67 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-34 (2004) (Congress acted within its Section 5
powers in requiring states to make judicial facilities accessible to the physically handicapped because the
remedy was congruent and proportional to a documented need to enforce constitutional rights).
68 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Note, Murray v. Giarratano: A Remedy Reduced to a Meaningless
Ritual, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 765, 809 (1990) (making this proposal).
69 See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 931 (Commentary to Guideline 1.1).
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